Can a CVX delegate pass on the voting weight I assigned to it?

The delegation system supports one delegation level, so weight received from another holder does not continue through a chain of delegates. A recipient can delegate its own vlCVX weight, but that separate assignment does not pass on the weight that other holders assigned to it. Gauge and DAO delegation remain separate.

Why does entering my own address fail in a CVX delegation field?

The delegation contract rejects assigning your own address as your delegate. Direct voting does not require that self-assignment. Removing the delegate assignment is the supported way to leave the relevant category undelegated; the removal takes effect from the next epoch. It does not withdraw the CVX or bypass the existing lock expiry.

What happens if I change the same delegate setting twice during one epoch?

The latest assignment replaces the earlier pending assignment for that next epoch. The contract overwrites the record for the same starting epoch, so the changes do not create multiple simultaneous delegates. This applies within the selected delegation category; changing a gauge delegate does not overwrite the separate DAO delegate setting.

Does a delegate need its own CVX lock to vote with delegated weight?

A delegate can vote using effective vlCVX weight received from other holders without having its own CVX lock. The received weight must apply to the proposal’s recorded epoch and voting category. Ordinary CVX in the recipient’s wallet is not the measure of that delegated authority, and an inactive proposal cannot accept a vote.

Is a registered vote surrogate allowed to override a DAO vote I cast myself?

A registered surrogate cannot override your direct DAO vote on the same proposal. Surrogate registration authorizes another address to submit a vote on your behalf, which differs from accumulating delegated voting weight. The DAO voting contract blocks the surrogate once you have voted directly on that proposal.

Will a revised gauge vote add to my earlier allocation?

A new gauge vote replaces your previous allocation for the same active proposal. The voting contract removes the old contribution before recording the revised one, so re-voting does not stack another full allocation on top. The replacement still needs eligible gauges and allocations that total 100%.

How are fractional vlCVX balances recorded for delegation?

Delegation records store voting weight in 0.1 vlCVX increments and truncate smaller fractions. That precision applies to the stored delegation weight, not to the number of CVX tokens owned or a deduction from the locked principal. Proposal weight also depends on the relevant epoch and applicable voting adjustments.

Convexfinance lets locked CVX holders delegate gauge and DAO votes separately

Convexfinance lets holders assign separate delegates for gauge allocations and DAO proposals using vote-locked CVX, known as vlCVX. A gauge delegate can allocate voting weight across eligible gauges, while a DAO delegate can vote on supported governance proposals. These assignments do not transfer the locked tokens. Delegation changes take effect from the next weekly epoch, and each proposal uses its recorded epoch. The underlying CVX remains subject to its lock expiry.

Oct 13, 2026 updated

Assigning a gauge delegate leaves DAO delegation separate, so a holder can keep direct DAO voting while another address handles emission allocations.

Gauge delegates and emission allocations

Gauge delegation gives a selected address voting authority over supported emission allocations, connecting the holder’s vlCVX weight to decisions about eligible gauges. Curve uses gauge weights to direct CRV emissions. The gauge voting categories cover Curve and f(x) Protocol, whose gauges remain subject to their respective registries. A voter distributes the available voting allocation across one or more eligible gauges, with percentages totaling 100%. These allocations determine the distribution of emission weight among the eligible gauges.

The lock interface offers a field for a specific address and gauge delegate shortcuts for the Convex team, Votium and Stake DAO. Delegating does not select a particular pool at the moment of assignment. A delegate’s later gauge vote supplies that allocation within the applicable proposal. Curve gauges must satisfy the registry’s active-gauge checks, including the requirement that they are not killed.

DAO delegates and proposal decisions

DAO delegation covers proposal decisions for Curve, f(x) Protocol, Frax, Resupply and Convex through their supported governance categories in the on-chain system. DAO means decentralized autonomous organization. Here, the delegate expresses a position on a proposal through yes and no allocations. A delegate can allocate all voting weight to yes or no, or split the weight between them. The aggregate result can be submitted proportionally where the external governance system supports weighted voting.

A gauge delegate can differ from the address handling protocol decisions. Gauge voting and DAO voting have independent delegation settings.

Voting authority and locked-token control

Delegating vlCVX voting weight does not transfer the holder’s CVX or vlCVX to the delegate. The selected address receives authority to vote with the applicable weight. The CVX lock remains associated with the holder, and delegation does not shorten its withdrawal restriction.

The delegate’s allocations influence the aggregate vote, including the pools that receive emission weight or the position taken on an administrative proposal. The selected address can express a voting preference that differs from the holder’s preference. The documented voting contracts let the holder vote directly while the proposal is active. They remove the holder’s weight from the delegate’s contribution for that proposal.

Gauge-only delegation with direct DAO voting

In this hypothetical comparison, a holder has active vlCVX, no existing delegation and a lock that has not expired. Their question is whether assigning a gauge delegate also hands over DAO decisions. They want another address to allocate gauges while they vote on DAO proposals directly.

Under a gauge-only assignment, the selected address receives gauge voting authority for applicable proposal epochs after the change takes effect. The holder keeps DAO weight undelegated and can submit their own DAO vote.

Assigning that same address as the DAO delegate would also allow it to vote on DAO proposals with the holder’s weight.

Both configurations leave the underlying CVX lock in place. The chosen assignment applies only to proposals that use an epoch in which it has taken effect. A proposal tied to an earlier epoch retains that epoch’s delegation state.

Proposal epochs and delegate changes

A proposal reads delegation and vlCVX weight for its recorded epoch, so a wallet’s latest delegate setting can differ from the assignment that applies. Delegation history preserves which address was active for each epoch. The proposal’s voting period and its recorded epoch therefore answer different questions: when votes can be submitted and which balance and delegation state govern them.

Delegation changes take effect from the next weekly lock epoch. Weekly epochs begin on Thursday at 00:00 UTC. A confirmed delegate change records a future assignment. It does not establish that the newly selected address can already use that weight on every active proposal.

An ongoing proposal can continue using an earlier epoch after the next weekly boundary passes. Changing the delegate does not rewrite that proposal’s recorded epoch. Newly locked CVX also starts contributing after the next epoch begins.

Synchronized balances and usable vote weight

Delegation weight records need updates when a holder’s lock balance changes, because choosing a delegate and synchronizing voting weight serve different purposes. The delegation contract’s sync function updates recorded weight from the lock data. Voting contracts can also synchronize automatically when they detect a mismatch while initializing an account for a proposal. A larger lock balance alone does not establish that a delegate’s existing proposal vote already includes the additional weight. Re-voting can refresh the applicable voting weight while the proposal remains active.

An expired, unprocessed lock can block synchronization. Processing expired locks or relocking clears the condition that prevents the weight update.

Aggregated votes and external execution

A delegate’s submitted vote contributes to the combined vlCVX result; it does not independently determine the entire vote that reaches an external protocol. Gauge results reflect each gauge’s share of the total vlCVX weight that voted on that proposal. That denominator is participating voting weight, so it differs from all CVX in circulation or all tokens held in the locker.

After a gauge proposal ends and is finalized, the executor can submit aggregate allocations through the relevant external gauge voting system, including in batches. The documented Curve and f(x) gauge executors accept only the latest proposal after finalization. They reject execution after that proposal’s recorded weekly epoch has passed. Recording an individual vote therefore does not establish that the final allocation has already been executed externally. The proposal result and its external execution are distinct states.

DAO proposals also have a finalization period. Supported executable proposals use the relevant vote executor, while other proposal types can require additional operational steps for the target protocol. Voting within the on-chain system does not make every external governance decision executable through the same contract. Curve and Resupply have dedicated DAO executors in the voting infrastructure.

Voting incentives and fees for locked CVX

Locked CVX earns a share of platform fees, while incentivized gauge votes can provide a separate reward stream tied to the selected pools and voting round. Curve and f(x) Protocol gauge votes run every two weeks. External incentives are offered through third-party platforms including Votium and VoteMarket. A platform-fee reward and an incentive for directing emissions arise from different mechanisms, even when both concern the same locked position.

Choosing a delegate assigns voting authority; it does not, by itself, specify an incentive token, payout amount or distribution arrangement. Those details belong to the incentive program and the applicable vote. A pool that receives gauge weight need not offer the same incentives as another pool. A displayed annualized reward rate is also different from an amount that is already claimable.

Lock expiry, relocking and withdrawal

The CVX locker keeps tokens inaccessible for 16 full weekly epochs, with the remaining time before the next epoch added to a new lock’s duration. A lock created immediately before the boundary therefore approaches 16 weeks. A lock created earlier in the week includes more time before its first full epoch. Its withdrawal eligibility follows the actual expiry, regardless of the chosen delegate.

Relocking expired CVX can restore voting weight for the current epoch, which differs from adding a fresh lock that begins contributing in the next epoch. This is a rule for expired tokens that are relocked, not a general exemption for new deposits. Expired lock entries may also need processing before voting weight can be synchronized and used.

Removing delegation changes the voting assignment. It leaves the existing lock’s withdrawal condition in place until the required 16 full epochs have passed.

CVX staking and cvxCRV positions

Ordinary CVX staking earns a share of platform revenue distributed as cvxCRV, with withdrawal available at any time for that staking position. Vote locking has a different withdrawal rule and provides vlCVX voting weight. The staking pool’s revenue exposure does not turn that position into a voting lock. A wallet can separately receive delegated voting weight, but that authority comes from another holder’s vlCVX assignment.

Converting CRV into cvxCRV is irreversible through the conversion mechanism, although cvxCRV itself can be staked and unstaked. Holding that token does not substitute for a CVX voting lock. LP reward boosting and cvxCRV staking concern reward participation; the delegation settings concern governance weight derived from locked CVX.

Voting gas and proposal availability

Gauge and DAO votes through the current governance interface are on-chain transactions, so submitting those votes requires ETH to pay the transaction’s gas charge. The charge varies with the transaction and network gas price. Earlier Snapshot-based voting instructions describe a previous arrangement. Their assumptions about signing a vote do not describe the current on-chain submission requirement.

A category displaying No proposal yet has no active proposal in that category. This does not establish that the wallet’s delegation failed. An inactive Curve DAO Proposals section does not establish that the separate Curve Gauge Weights category is also inactive.

Visual summary: Voting gas and proposal availability (Convexfinance) — Voting gas and proposal availability.

Open full-size image

Convexfinance: questions and answers

Can a CVX delegate pass on the voting weight I assigned to it?: The delegation system supports one delegation level, so weight received from another holder does not continue through a chain of delegates. A recipient can delegate its own vlCVX weight, but that separate assignment does not pass on the weight that other holders assigned to it. Gauge and DAO delegation remain separate.
Why does entering my own address fail in a CVX delegation field?: The delegation contract rejects assigning your own address as your delegate. Direct voting does not require that self-assignment. Removing the delegate assignment is the supported way to leave the relevant category undelegated; the removal takes effect from the next epoch. It does not withdraw the CVX or bypass the existing lock expiry.
What happens if I change the same delegate setting twice during one epoch?: The latest assignment replaces the earlier pending assignment for that next epoch. The contract overwrites the record for the same starting epoch, so the changes do not create multiple simultaneous delegates. This applies within the selected delegation category; changing a gauge delegate does not overwrite the separate DAO delegate setting.
Does a delegate need its own CVX lock to vote with delegated weight?: A delegate can vote using effective vlCVX weight received from other holders without having its own CVX lock. The received weight must apply to the proposal’s recorded epoch and voting category. Ordinary CVX in the recipient’s wallet is not the measure of that delegated authority, and an inactive proposal cannot accept a vote.
Is a registered vote surrogate allowed to override a DAO vote I cast myself?: A registered surrogate cannot override your direct DAO vote on the same proposal. Surrogate registration authorizes another address to submit a vote on your behalf, which differs from accumulating delegated voting weight. The DAO voting contract blocks the surrogate once you have voted directly on that proposal.
Will a revised gauge vote add to my earlier allocation?: A new gauge vote replaces your previous allocation for the same active proposal. The voting contract removes the old contribution before recording the revised one, so re-voting does not stack another full allocation on top. The replacement still needs eligible gauges and allocations that total 100%.
How are fractional vlCVX balances recorded for delegation?: Delegation records store voting weight in 0.1 vlCVX increments and truncate smaller fractions. That precision applies to the stored delegation weight, not to the number of CVX tokens owned or a deduction from the locked principal. Proposal weight also depends on the relevant epoch and applicable voting adjustments.